

1490. p. 138.
Hireling Artifice Detected:

OR, THE
PROFIT and LOSS

OF
G R E A T - B R I T A I N,
IN THE PRESENT
W A R with S P A I N,

Set in its **T R U E L I G H T ;**

By laying before the **P U B L I C K**, as Full, Compleat,
and Regular a **L I S T** as can be had, of the
British **S H I P S** taken since the Beginning of the
W A R ; with proper **R E M A R K S** upon the
L I S T, and upon our Conduct both at Home
and Abroad.



L O N D O N :
Printed for **T. COOPER**, at the *Globe* in
Paternoster-Row. 1742.
[Price One Shilling.]

THE

PROFESSOR



OF

THE

WARRIOR

OF THE

The British Museum, London, has been
the repository of the most valuable
and interesting objects of art and
science since the foundation of the
Museum, and it is a pleasure to
see that the collection of the
Warrior is now in the hands of
the British Museum.



LONDON:

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Hireling Artifice detected, &c.

OF all National Misfortunes one of the most terrible is, to be governed by Men who not only plunder the Property, but insult the Understanding of the People. Can a free People? Can a brave People bear such Treatment? If they do, they have no Pretence to Freedom; what is still worse, they have no Pretence to Courage. They are not only Slaves, but cowardly Slaves. It is a Misfortune to be oppressed: It is a Misfortune to have our Properties exposed to foreign or domestick Plunderers; but it is an unsufferable Provocation to find those that oppress and expose us, endeavouring to justify themselves by an Imposition upon our Understanding.

What is the present State of this Nation, I shall leave to be determined by those who have a Right, and are bound to enquire into it; but, I must say, I cannot help looking upon every *Gazetteer*, and every Piece that comes from the same Quarter, as a most provoking Insult upon the People of *Great-Britain*; and of all such Insults the most flagrant,

-grant, I think, is a Piece lately published, entitled, *The Profit and Loss of GREAT-BRITAIN in the present War with SPAIN, from JULY 1739, to JULY 1741.*

The Author of this motley Piece soon discovers the cloven Foot, by supposing, that our Minister did not for many Years evade a War, after there remained no Probability that our just Demands would be granted without it: That our Minister did not for many Years sit still and laugh at the Calamities of the Subject: That the Treaties he made with *Spain* for avoiding, or rather for putting off a War, were justifiable: That the Expence he put us to, by augmenting our Forces and manning our Fleets, added Weight to His perplext Negotiations: That there were great Difficulties in manning our Squadrons at the Beginning of the War: That out of a more numerous standing Army than was ever before kept up in Time of Peace, none could be spared abroad; and that it would have been imprudent to have transported any of the old Corps, before the new ones were in some Measure disciplin'd.

These Suppositions, I say, shew the cloven Foot, notwithstanding the Author's Pretence to Indifference as to the Persons that direct the State Machine, and notwithstanding his Pretence to Impartiality as to the Court or Country Party; and as these Suppositions have



have all been sufficiently exposed, it is needless for me to repeat what has been already said upon the Subject. I shall therefore proceed to examine whether *Great-Britain* has been a Gainer or a Loser by the present War, by first giving a true List of the *British* Ships taken since the Commencement of the War, and then making such Remarks upon the Author's Account of Profit and Loss, and upon our Circumstances in general, as may enable the Reader to judge whether this War has been conducted in a blundering Manner, or in such a Manner as it might and ought to have been.

I shall begin with advertising the Reader, that this surprising List of *British* Ships taken by such an impotent Enemy, was not made up at a Distance from *London*, where no such List can possibly be made up, but that it was made up here in *London*, after the most diligent Enquiry, and most exact Information from those whose Interest it is to keep an Account of all Ships taken and lost; therefore it may be look'd on as an authentic List, or at least as authentic as any that can be made up without the Assistance of public Authority. However, I am far from pretending that it is compleat, or that there are no Errors to be found in it. The Reader will see, that we have had Advices of several Ships being taken whose Names, Com-
B 2
manders,

manders, Voyages, or Places carried to, I could not learn; and as to the Values, even here at *London*, I could get no such Account of them as would warrant my fixing a Value upon any one, therefore I have left a Blank Column for the Values, which every Reader may fill up as far as his Knowledge or Information can reach. And I must observe, that several Ships may have been taken, especially in the *West-Indies*, of which I could get no Information; for when no Insurance is made here in *London* upon Ship or Cargo, it is a great Chance if we ever hear of the Ship's being taken.

The first Column of the following List contains the Dates of the Advices we received here in *London*, of the Ship's being taken: The 2d. contains the Ship's Name: The 3d. the Master's Name: The 4th. the Voyage: The 5th. the Place she was carried to; and, the 6th Column I have left Blank for the Value. And where I could meet with no certain Information as to the Name of the Ship or Master, or as to the Voyage, or the Place she was carried to, I have left it Blank, that if any more full Information can be had, it may hereafter be filled up.

To bring this List into as little Room as possible, I have made use of the following Abbreviations which the Reader is desired to take Notice of. *Viz.*

Af.

Af.	for Africa	Leg.	for Leghorn
Am.	America	Lis.	Lisbon
Amst.	Amsterdam	Liv.	Liverpool
Ant.	Antego	Lon.	London
Barb.	Barbadoes	Mad.	Madera
Bid.	Biddiford	Mar.	Marseilles
Bourd.	Bourdeaux	Nap.	Naples
Bris.	Bristol	Newc.	Newcastle
Can.	Canaries	NewE.	New-England
Car.	Carolina	Newf.	Newfoundland.
Chef.	Chester	Op.	Oporto
Chich.	Chichester	Pen.	Pensilvania
Dart.	Dartmouth	Phil.	Philadelphia
Dub.	Dublin	Port.	Portugal
Eng.	England	Rot.	Rotterdam
Fal.	Falmouth	St. Ch.	St. Christophers
Gal.	Galipoli	Scan.	Scandaroon
Gen.	Genoa	Sic.	Sicily
Gib.	Gibraltar	South.	Southampton
Glas.	Glasgow	Tin.	Tinmouth
Guer.	Guernsey	Ven.	Venice
Ham.	Hamburgh	Vir.	Virginia
Hol.	Holland	Wat.	Waterford
Hon.	Honduras	W. I.	Western Islands
Jam.	Jamaica	Wey.	Weymouth
Jer.	Jersey	White.	Whitehaven
Irl.	Ireland	Yar.	Yarmouth
Lan.	Lancaster		

<i>Advices.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Ships Names.</i>	<i>Mr's. Name.</i>
1739.			
Sep. 12	1	Chesterfield,	Reynolds,
24	2	Glead,	Glead,
25	3	Port Merchant	Belgard,
	4	Sarah,	Dalton,
	5	Adriatic,	Hanway,
	6	Charming Sally	Brown,
	7	Eltham,	M ^c namara,
	8	Friendship,	Lower,
	9	Thomas,	Hayden,
Oct. 5	10	Will. and John,	Legget,
8	11	Edin. Packet,	Sutherland,
	12	Will. and Mary	Cullender,
10	13	St. Anthony,	Obrien,
	14	Jam. and Lewis	Malcolm,
22	15	Hannah,	Huffey,
	16	Leman,	Leman,
	17	Jane,	M ^c echran,
27	18	St. Joseph,	White,
29	19	Britannia,	Bond,
	20	Aurora,	Maxwell,
	21	Will. and Anne	Daman,
Nov. 5	22	Betty,	Stevens,
	23	Golden Fleece,	Lee,
	24		Woodbury
	25		Calley,
	26		Lecras
	27	John and Mary	Botley,
6	28	St. John,	Chestey,

No.	<i>On what Voyage.</i>	<i>where car-Value. ried.</i>
1	Gal. to Amst.	Malaga.
2	Newf. to Bilboa,	St. Sebas.
3	Nap. to Hol.	Oran.
4	St. Rhemo to Lon.	Savona.
5		
6	Stopt at Malaga, but af-	
7	terwards discharged con-	
8	ditionally.	
9		
10	Gal. to Rot.	Alicant.
11	Op. to Lo. 70 Pipes Wine	St. Sebas.
12	Cork to Bourd.	Ditto.
13	Cork to Lif.	Ditto.
14	Minton to Ham.	Cartagena.
15	New En. to Bilboa,	Lanes
16	{ to the Morea, tak- en by a Malt. off St An.	
17	Dub. to Mar. seiz'd at	Barcelona.
18	Lon. to Faro, a rich Ship,	Huelva.
19	Br. to Phil. but lost going in	St. Sebas.
20	W. Isl. to Port.	St. Ubes.
21	Newf. to Leg.	Alicant.
22	New En. to Bilboa,	Lequito.
23		
24	Newf. to	Bilboa.
25		
26		
27	Do. to—75 Tons seiz'd at	Gijon.
28	Bourd. to Dub.	
		29 Argyle

<i>Advices.</i>	<i>Ships Name.</i>	<i>Mr's Name.</i>
1739.	No.	
Nov. 6	29 Argyle,	Luck,
	30 Pretty Pachy,	Spark,
	31 Rachell,	Roufe,
13	32 Dolphin,	Rymes,
14	33 Somerset,	Oliver,
21	34 Enfield,	Smith,
26	35 Johanna,	Taylor,
	36 Friendship,	Smith,
	37 Pr. of Orange	Seers.
	38	Wilkie,
	39	Buckle,
	40 A small Vessel	
	41 Anne Pink,	
Dec. 3	42 St. Martin,	Kirwan,
10	43 Ford Brig.	Tucker,
12	44 Neptune,	Lynn,
	45 Providence,	Donaldson,
24	46 Sturminster,	Hooper,
26	47 Fellowship,	Pincombe,
1740.		
Jan. 8	48 Julian,	Brame,
10	49 Peggy,	Gault,
11	50 Sarah,	Addis,
22	51 King George,	French,
	52 Bethulia,	Collins,
24	53 William,	Love,

*On what Voyage. where car-Value.
ried.*

- | | | |
|----|---|-------------|
| 29 | Sic. to Lif. 1300 Salm. | |
| | Wheat, | |
| 30 | Sic. to Lif. 1000 ditto. | } Majorca. |
| 31 | Sic. to Lif. 130 Bales | |
| | Cotton. | |
| 32 | Lon. to Bar. | St. Sebas. |
| 33 | Sic. to Lif. | Alicant. |
| 34 | Lon. to Bar. | St. Sebas. |
| 35 | Cork to Gib. | Cadix. |
| 36 | Op. to South. | St. Sebas. |
| 37 | Dub. to Ven. | Ditto. |
| 38 | { Scotland to Bourd. | |
| 39 | | |
| 40 | to Mad. with Pilchards | St. Sebas. |
| 41 | Hon. to Bris. | Havanna. |
| 42 | { Dub. to Faro, put into,
and seized | Cadix. |
| 43 | Leg. to Lon. | Almeria. |
| 44 | Scan. to Leg. | Pt. Spezia. |
| 45 | Nap. to Lif. | Majorca. |
| 46 | Newf. to Port. | St. Sebas. |
| 47 | Chef. to Leg. | Cartagena. |
| 48 | Sic. to Lif. | Cartagena. |
| 49 | Phil. to Lif. 120 Tons | Vigo. |
| 50 | Newf. to Viana 120 Tons | Gijon. |
| 51 | Dub. to Rochfort | St. Sebas. |
| 52 | Lif. to Lon. off the Bar. | Ditto. |
| 53 | Cork to Lif. off the Barr. | |

(10)

<i>Advices.</i>	<i>Ships Name.</i>	<i>Mr's Name.</i>
1740.		
Jan. 24	54 Margaret,	Michan,
28	55 Totness,	Bursell,
	56 Polly,	Norman,
	57 Expedition,	Barker,
	58 N. S. de Gra-	D. Sil. Rocha,
	cia,	
Feb. 18	59 Paz. Garden,	Nutt,
	60 Dispatch,	Collins,
	61 Sufanna,	Denn,
19	62 City of Han.	
28	63 Springfield,	Purnell
Mar. 5	64 Industry,	Whiting,
10	65 Molly,	Tape,
19	66 Harrison,	Hopson,
	67 Vigilance,	Hill,
	68 Eleanor,	Swan,
	69 Prince Henry,	Stamper,
21	70 4 Brothers,	Potberry,
	71 Mary,	Lovering,
	72 Unity,	Fell
	73 Elizabeth,	Nixon,
	74 Hap. Return,	Basset,

Q2

((FR))

On what Voyage. where car- Value.
ried.

- | | | |
|----|----------------------------|-------------|
| 54 | { Amst. to Bilboa, off the | St. Sebas. |
| | { Barr, | |
| 55 | Newf. to Port. | Ditto. |
| 56 | Dit. to Lis. | Rio Roxo. |
| 57 | { Drove out of Op. forc'd | Gallicia. |
| | { in, and seized in | |
| 58 | { Lon. to Lis. about 60 | |
| | { Tons, with Biscuits for | Ferrol. |
| | { the K. of Portugal, | |
| 59 | { Can. to Lon. by 2 Span. | America. |
| | { Men of War, | |
| 60 | Zant to Lon. | Malaga. |
| 61 | Wat. to Faro, | Cadix. |
| 62 | Ham. to Op. | Vigo. |
| 63 | { Lon. to Gen. had un- | |
| | { loaded 3 Fourths of | Pt. Spezia. |
| | { her Cargo, | |
| 64 | { New Eng. put in and | Vigo. |
| | { seized at | |
| 65 | Lis. to Cork, | St. Sebast. |
| 66 | { Vir. to Lon. 780 Hogf- | Ditto. |
| | { heads Tobacco, | |
| 67 | Yar. to Civita Vecchia, | Pt. Spezia. |
| 68 | Exon to Gen. | Ditto. |
| 69 | Zealand to Straits, | Cadix. |
| 70 | of Topsham, | |
| 71 | | |
| 72 | of Lancaster, | |
| 73 | Youghall to Rot. | |
| 74 | of Penzance, | |

} all
taken
off
the
Lizd.

Advices. Ships Names. Mr's Name.

1740.

Mar. 26	75	Ortava,	Maxey,	
27	76	Palma,	Woodrop,	
31	77	Ja. and Christ,	Graham,	
	78	Ann,	Curling,	
	79	Ab. and Arth.	Bray,	
April 21	80	Boston Pink,	Denn,	
22	81	Unity of Bid.	Phillips,	
30	82		Grimes,	
May 5	83	Unity,	Henan,	
	84	Mad. Merch.	Parker,	
	85	Wm. and Ann	Jobson,	
	86	Han. and El.	White,	
22	87	Nativity,	White,	
	88	Hanna,	Deering,	
29	89	Hardwick,	Offering,	
31	90			
	91	Geo. and Ann,	Fowler,	
	92		Bromart,	
June 2	93	Richmond,	Shewel,	
	94	Bar. Packet,	Defon,	
	95	John Snow,	Rowland,	
4	96	Adv. of Exon,	Watkins,	

Ob

On what Voyage, where car- Valued.

- | | | |
|----|--|-------------|
| 75 | Can. to Lif. | Caraccas. |
| 76 | to the Levant, | Pt. Spezia. |
| 77 | Sic. to Amst. 140 Tons, | Corunna. |
| 78 | New-E. to Lon. | Ditto. |
| 79 | { West of Eng. to--with
Pilchards, | Ditto. |
| 80 | { Dart. to Newf. 2d day
after sailing. | |
| 81 | { Gib. to Lon. off the
Land's End, | |
| 82 | { New E. to Lon. in the
Channel, | |
| 83 | Jam. to Liv. | St. Sebas. |
| 84 | Ditto to Bris. | Ditto. |
| 85 | Gib. to Lon. | Ferrol. |
| 86 | Malaga to Bristol, 288
Pipes of Wine. } | St. Sebas. |
| 87 | Irl. to Bourd. | Ditto. |
| 88 | New En. to Bristol, | Ditto. |
| 89 | Malaga to Lon. | Ferrol. |
| 90 | Bid. to Lif. with Fish,
Genoa to Lon. but re- | St. Sebas. |
| 91 | taken by the Tyger }
Man of War. | |
| 92 | Amst. to Santa Cruz, }
with Ammunition, | |
| 93 | Gib. to Lon. | St. Sebas. |
| 94 | Pool to Fal. | Morlaix. |
| 95 | Guer. to Car. | |
| 96 | Leg. to Dub. | Cadix. |

Advices.

Arrives. *Ships Name.* *M^r's Name.*

1740.

	No.		
June 4	97	Sattel,	Howard,
	98	Cleland,	Daws,
	99	Dorothy,	Beft,
7	100	Biddeford,	Fenney
	101	Durfley,	Wilson
	102	Pr. of Orange,	Eames,
13	103	Expedition,	Nisbet,
	104		
	105	Rob. & Sarah,	Darlow,
23	106	Vineyard,	Villacot,
26	107	Ham. Merch.	French,
	108	Barb. Factor,	Copeland,
	109		John Davis,
	110	Anna Maria,	Janfen,
	111	Anne,	Jobson,
	112	Endeavour,	Fox,
July 2	113	Mar. & Mary,	Wilcox,
	114		
	115		
7	116	Balt. Mercht.	Holloway,

No.	On what Voyage.	Where carried.	Value.
97	Chef. to Lon.	P. Passage.	
98	Op. to Chef. 60 Tons,	Ferrol.	
99	Portland to Dub.	P. Passage.	
100	Brif. and Cork to Jam.	St. Sebast.	
101			
102	Wey. to in the Channel.		
103	Mad. to Vir.	Havanna.	
104	Cork to Gib. with Provisions.	Old Gib.	
105	Op. to Lyme 50 Pipes of Wine		
106	to Morlaix.		
107	Gen. to Ham.	Genoa.	
108	Cut out of the Sta Cruz Road.		
109	Wales to Chich. taken in the Channel.		
110	Lon. and Fal. to Leg.	Cadiz.	
111	Vir. to Lond.	Ferrol.	
112	Bourd. to Dub.	St. Sebast.	
113	Vir. to Liv.	Do.	
114	A small Ship loaded with Coals.	Do.	
115	Another ditto.	Do.	
116	Car. to Lon. after an obstinate Defence, Col. Braithwaite murdered.	Do.	

(16)

Advices. *Ships Name.* *Mrs's Name.*

1740.

July 14 117 Townf. Pack. Cooper,

16 118 Dorothy, Douglas,

119 Mary, Redman,

19 120 Beaver, Webber,

28 121 Loveling,

122 Tracey,

123 Sarah Galley, Reed,

Aug. 6 124 Wyniau, Bruce,

11 125 P. Perchard,

126 City of Roan, Pental,

14 127

128 Welcome, Bell,

27 129 Two Sisters, Burfel,

130 Mitta Maria, Lingester,

131 Amsterdam, Veering,

132 Wint. Galley, Trueman,

133 Mich. Reiby,

134 John Castle,

135 Provid. Brig: Dawkins,

Sep. 4 136 Jacoba Galley Agustenburger,

On

No.	<i>On what Voyage.</i>	<i>Where carried. Value.</i>
117	{ Lif. to Falmouth with 11,000 Moidores, &c. Do. on board,	Do.
118	Ant. to Lon.	Do.
119	Dub. to Nantz,	Do.
120	New En. to Bris.	Do.
121	Rot. to Neath.	Do.
122	Tin. to Milford,	Do.
123	Gal. to Lon. after an obstinate Defence.	Cagliari.
124	Af. to Am.	Havanna.
125	Jersey,	
126	Havre to Diep,	St. Sebast.
127	{ Taken by a pretended French Fishing Boat, after selling Brandy to the Squad. at Tor- bay,	
128	Gen. to Cork,	Corunna.
129	Norway to Dart.	Hayre.
130	Gal. to Rot.	Messina.
131	France to Lif.	Do.
132	{ Newc. to Gib. but re- taken by the Sunder- land,	
133	Waterford 45 Tons,	C. Ortugal.
134	Wat. to Lif. 60 Tons,	Corunna.
135	Penz. to Fal. 25 Tons,	
136	Lond. to Leg.	Cartagena.

<i>Advices.</i>		<i>Ships Name.</i>	<i>Mr's Name.</i>
1741.			
Sep. 8	137	Peggy,	Nowell,
15	138	Davie,	Patten,
29	139	Charm. Sally,	Watson,
	140	Two Brothers	Rea,
	141	Dolphin,	Dannacot,
Oct. 1	142	Mary,	Aylward,
14	143	Unicorn	Pulkinhorn,
23	144	Margaritta,	Le Conty,
	145	Unity,	Hunter,
	146	Laurel,	Trefs,
	147	Hopegood,	Seager,
29	148	Port Royal,	Nicholson,
	149	Mary,	Lushington,
Nov. 4	150	Margaret,	Taylor,
	151	Olive Branch,	Gaden,
10	152	Illust. Pair,	Wildey,
	153	Prosperity,	Lawson,
24	154	Clement,	Ketcher,
	155	Nancy,	Man,
	156	Freame,	Green,
	157	Joseph,	Hamilton,
	158	Union,	Leviscount,
	159	Molly,	Westcomb,

No.	<i>On what Voyage.</i>	<i>where car-Value. ried.</i>
	Lond. to Op. after 3	
137	Hours Engagement.	
138	Car. to Lon.	St. Sebast.
139	Lond. to Havre,	Havre.
140	Cork to Lif.	Corunna.
141	Phil. to Lif. but retaken by the Deal Castle.	
142	Dub. to Lif.	Paniche.
143	Lond. to Fal. taken off Folkstone.	
144	Lon. to Messina, with Woollen Goods, &c.	Tariffa.
145	Petersburg to Lif.	Paniche.
146	Phil. to Lisbon,	Do.
147	Do. to Do.	Do.
148	Jam. to Bris.	St. Sebast.
149	Fal. to Straits with Pil- chards.	
150	Newf. to Leg.	
151	Do. to Port.	Galicia.
152	Bris. to	St. Sebast.
153	Cut out of Sta Cruz Road.	
154	Newf. to Eng.	St. Sebast.
155	Lif. to Phil. by the Fer-	
156	rol Squadron,	
157		
158	Guer. to Newf.	St. Sebast.
159	Humble to Fowey, but retaken by the Rose,	

(20)

<i>Advices.</i>		<i>Ships Names.</i>	<i>Mr's Name.</i>
1740.			
Dec. 1	160		
	161	Plymouth,	Olive,
	162	Francis,	Clark,
	163	Nancy,	Rosfiter,
	164	Thomas,	Buchanan,
	165	Wilhelmina,	Backer,
	166	Pr. Amelia,	Murthland,
1741.			
Jan. 19	167	Union,	Scot,
24	168	Michael,	Lanfety,
28	169	Gothick Lion	Morcen,
Feb. 3	170	Gibraltar,	Bevan,
9	171	Ch. and Molly	Perier,
16	172	Thomas,	Murray,
18	173	Supply,	Tobin,
	174	Angola,	Toman,
	175		
	176		
Mar. 9	177	Mary Snow,	Best,
16	178	Bolton,	Walton,
20	179	John,	Blomart,
24	180	Polly,	Parker,
	181	Paulus,	A Dutchman
April 8	182	Wilmington,	Bulmer,

No.	On what Voyage.	where car-ried.	Value.
160	Newf. to Pool,	St. Sebast.	
161	Newf. to Port,	Lisbon.	
162	St. Ch. to Lon.	Ferrol.	
163	Wat. to Op.	Galicia.	
164	Scotland going into	Morlaix.	
165	Amst. to Leg.	Barcelona.	
166	Dub. cut out of Santa Cruz Road,		
167	Fal. to the Straits,	St. Sebast.	
168	Bar. to Guer.	Caracca.	
169	Leg. to Mar. blown up } in the Engagement. }		
170	Faro to Lon.	Faro.	
171	Cork to Phil.	St. Sebas.	
172	Liv. to Op.	Ditto.	
173	Cork to Gib.	Ditto.	
174	Car. to Cowes,	St. August.	
175	Another at the same } Time, }	Ditto.	
176	A 3d taken with them,	Ditto.	
177	Car. to Lon.	St. Sebas.	
178	Ditto to ditto.	Ditto.	
179	Bris. to Gen. after a } stout Resistance. }	Genoa.	
180	Newf. to Op.	Viana.	
181	Mountsbay to Nap.	Galicia.	
182	Turkey to Lon. with } Raisins, }		

Advices.

<i>Advices.</i>	<i>Ships Names.</i>	<i>Mr's Name.</i>
1741.		
April 8	183 Stamboline,	Hays,
	184 Induſtry,	Cob,
15	185 Ellen,	Roul,
	186 Carbonier,	Pyke,
	187 Elizabeth,	Davis,
	188	Real of Fowy
	189 Prudent Sarah	Warner,
	190 Britannia,	Dent,
May 4	191 Anne,	Mitchel,
	192 Telemachus,	Auſten,
6	193 Endeavour,	Whaley,
11	194	Buck,
	195	Murray,
	196 Katherine,	Webb,
	197 Mermaid,	Ja. Lecatta,
	198 London Poſt,	Ruffel,
19	199 Dove,	Lee,
25	200 2 Brothers,	Grantland,
	201 Naſſau,	Spelman,
	202 Swallow,	Blake,
	203 Cleeve,	Damon,
29	204 Speedwell,	Wilſon,
	205	

Toul,

On

No.	<i>On what Voyage.</i>	<i>Where car-Value. ried.</i>
183	Do. to do. but retaken } by the Colchester,	
184	Lynn to Op.	Figura.
185	Lon. to Op. after sink- } ing the Privateer,	Vigo.
186	Pool to Newf.	
187	Tin. to Newf.	Havre.
188	Guer. to ---- with To- } bacco, Salt, &c.	Ditto.
189	Lon. to N. York,	St. Sebas.
190	Cork to Gen.	Ditto.
191	Fal. to Port.	
192	Leg. to Lon.	St. Sebas.
193	Liv. to Lif.	Paniche.
194	Swansey to Op.	Vigo.
195	to New En.	
196	Dub. to Lif.	
197		
198	Gal. to ---- by 8 Span. } Men of War,	
199	Liv. to Af.	St. Sebas.
200	Lif. to Newf.	Cadix.
201	Ditto to Ditto,	Cadix,
202	Bris. to Af. 3 days after } failing.	
203	Lif. to Lon.	St. Sebas.
204	Irl. to Op.	Vigo.
205	Barbary to ----- with } Wool and Wax,	St. Sebas.

Advices.

<i>Advices.</i>	<i>Ships Name.</i>	<i>Mr's Name.</i>
1741.	No.	
	206	
	207 Hannah,	Tout,
	208 De Witza } Catharina, }	Mittina,
June 8	209 Phoenix,	Buckley,
	210 Priscilla,	Cullen,
	211 Mary,	Seflock,
	212 Jn. and Mary,	Byrn,
11	213 Sufanna,	Partington,
	214 Chichester,	
12	215 Jenny,	Ewell,
15	216 Jn. and Mary,	Troy,
24	217 Industry,	Smith,
	218 America,	Carr,
29	219 Catherine,	Bryant,
	220 Nonpareil,	Blackman,
	221 Mary,	Wilkie,
	222 Santa Clara,	Dafoy,
	223 Thomafine,	Richards,
July 6	224 Gale,	Blackburn,
	225 Lancaster,	Walker,
	226 Indian Queen	Dolman,
10	227 America,	Ritchie,
	228 Bronfdon,	Symfon,
14	229 Ranger,	Johnson,
	230 Lynn,	Swimmerton
20	231 Patuxent,	Shaw,
	232 Argyle,	Mac Cunn,

On

No.	<i>On what Voyage.</i>	<i>where car-Value-ried.</i>
206	New E. to-Pitch and Tar	St. Sebas.
207	New E. to Jam.	Porto Rico.
208	Lon. to Viana,	Vigo.
209	Lon. to Port Mahon, } with Recruits,	Lisbon.
210	Liv. to Ant.	St. Sebas.
211	Nantz to Bourd.	Ferrol.
212	Dub. to Bar.	St. Sebas.
213	Car. to Lif.	Ferrol.
214	Portsmouth to Lif.	Vigo.
215	Topsam to Op.	Ditto.
216	Lif. to Dub.	St. Sebas.
217	Lon. to Mad. and Vir.	
218	Car. to Lon.	St. Sebas.
219	Cork to Lif.	Paniche.
220	Lon. to Gib. by Cadix } Squadron,	
221	Newf. to Lif.	Lisbon.
222	Eng. to Gen. Pilchards,	Barcelona.
223	New En. to Hull,	St. Sebas.
224	Jam. to Lon.	St. August.
225	Ditto to Lan.	Ditto.
226	Ditto to Bristol,	Ditto.
227	Glas. to Vir. } near the	
228	Whitch to do. } Capes.	
229	Vir. to New York,	
230	Jer. to Lif.	Paniche.
231	Vir. to -- } coming out of	
232	Vir. to -- } the Capes.	

(26)

<i>Advices.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Ships Name.</i>	<i>Mr's Name.</i>
1741.			
July 20	233		Johnson,
	234		Sol. Sturges,
	235		Edm. Morton
	236		George,
	237	Crawford,	Ford,
22	238	Elizabeth,	Emmet,
28	239	Sally,	Mather,
	240	Friendship,	Wilson,
30	241		
	242	Agnes & Betty	Pottle,
Aug. 3	243	Durham,	Palmer,
	244	Southal,	Evans,
10	245	Providence,	Reffan,
	246	Mary,	Hays,
	247	Hope,	Bursell,
	248		Bursley,
	249		Card,
	250		Johnson,
	251		Taylor,
	252		Davis,
	253		Bunker,
	254		Severy,
	255		Lambert,
	256		Turtell,
	257	Success,	Mashiter,
	258	Thomas,	Murray,

On

No.	On what Voyage.	Where car-Value. ried.
233	----- with Corn and Provisions,	Havanna.
234		Ditto.
235	with Pitch and Tar,	Ditto.
236	Rode Island to ---	Ditto.
237	Lon. to Car. a rich Ship,	Ditto.
238	Newf. to	St. Sebast.
239	Exon to Car. retaken } by a Man of War, }	
240	taken on Guinea Coast.	Canaries.
241	Brif. to New En.	St. Sebast.
242	Newf. to Pool,	Ditto.
243	Bar. to Lon.	Rochelle.
244	Brif. to Phil.	St. Sebast.
245	Cork to Lif.	Rochelle,
246	Wat. to Op.	Ditto.
247	Bar. to Lan.	Do.
248		
249	} all Six taken in the Bay of Hon- duras.	
250		
251		
252		
253		
254	Phil. to Jam.	S. Ja. de Cu.
255	} Barb. to Guern.	Martinico.
256		
257	Lanc. to Oporto,	Galicia.
258	Liverp. to Oporto,	St. Sebast.

<i>Advices.</i>	<i>Ships Names.</i>	<i>Mr's. Name.</i>
1741.	No.	
Sept. 17	259	
	260	
	261	
	262	
	263	
	264 Phil. and John	Lecras,
	265 Mary,	Ahier,
	266 Durell,	Peircy,
	267 Diamond,	Hoar,
	268 Sarah,	Dupres,
22	269 Scudamore,	Middleton,
Octob. 1	270 William,	Ennis,
	271 Geo. and Hen.	Harvey,
	272 Dispatch,	Lewen,
	273 Success,	Cockman,
	274 Fortune,	Wood,
	275 Elizabeth,	Garrifon,
	276 Union,	Thomas,
	277 Providence,	Corvin,
6	278 Betty,	Shaw,
7	279 James,	May,
	280 Fran. & Wm.	Howland,
	281	Ja. Rule,
	282	Mitchel,
	283	Montgomery
	284	Ja. Phoenix,
	285	Evans,

No.	<i>On what Voyage.</i>	<i>where car-Value. ried.</i>
259	with Wine and Oil,	St. Sebas.
260	with Sugar,	Ditto.
261	Eng. to Newf. with } Apparel, &c.	Ditto.
262	with Naval Stores,	Do.
263	in Ballast,	Do.
264	Jer. to Newf.	Do.
265	Ditto to Ditto,	St. Malo,
266	Pool to Ditto,	St. Sebas.
267	Brif. to New En.	Ditto,
268	{ to ditto, re- taken by the Windfor.	
269	Bristol to	Havanna,
270	Phil. to Jam.	S. Ja.deCu.
271	Ditto to ditto,	Ditto.
272	Boston to ditto,	Do.
273	Ditto to ditto,	Do.
274	Ditto to Ditto,	Do.
275	New York to ditto,	Do.
276	Ditto to ditto,	Do.
277	Phil. to ditto retaken,	
278	Jam. to Vir.	St. Auguf.
279	New York to Gib.	Algazira.
280	Car. to ---	Ca.Francis
281	Cape Fear to Hull,	Ditto.
282	Bar. to New York,	Do.
283	Ant. to Vir.	Do.
284	to Jam.	Ditto,
285	Jam. to Brif.	Do.

Advices.

<i>Advices.</i>	<i>Ships Name.</i>	<i>Mr's Name.</i>
1741.	No.	
Octob. 7	286 Roebuck,	Stoddard,
	287 Enterprize,	Wood,
24	288 Robert,	Parker,
	289 Hannah,	Holmes,
Nov. 3.	290 Mercury,	Clack,
	291 Elizabeth,	Brown,
	292 3 Brothers,	Lacuta,
	293 Rose Galley,	Montgomery
	294 Careful Bridget	Brown,
	295 Dolphin,	Luce,
	296 Success,	Brooks,
	297 Ann & Eliz.	Culinan,
	298 Swan,	Falkener,
	299 Sarah,	Brooks,
	300 Hibernia,	Ewer,
9	301 Lucy,	Coffin,
10	302 Hibernia,	Carmody,
	303 Resolution,	Ley,
	304 Three Sisters,	Gardwell,
	305 St. Michael,	Dalton,
16	306 James,	Askew,
	307 Anne,	Doyle,
	308 Amelia,	Higgins,
	309 Lively,	Langton,
	310 John,	Chivers,
	311 Mary-Joseph,	Richard,
	312 Nottingham,	Tilson,
	313 Antigua Mer.	Stanny,
	314 Dartmouth,	Porter,

No.	On what Voyage.	where car-Value. ried.
286	St. Ch. to Lon.	St. Sebas.
287	Lon. to Gib. with Stores,	Vigo.
288	Vir. to Whitch. 214 } Hogheads Tobacco, }	St. Sebas.
289	Ditto to Liv. coming } out of the Capes. }	
290	Lon. to Vir. off the Capes	
291	Lif. to Cork,	St. Sebas.
292	Newf. to Jer.	Do.
293	Lif. to Cork,	Do.
294	Cork to Lif.	Do.
295	Newf. to Pool,	Do.
296	Lif. to Cork,	Do.
297	Cork to Lif.	Do.
298	St. Ch. to Phil.	
299	Lif. to Cork,	St. Sebas.
300	Bar. to Vir.	
301	Lon. to Boston,	St. Sebas.
302	Lif. to Cork,	Do.
303	Newf.	Bayonne.
304	Jam. to Liv.	St. Sebas.
305	Lim. to Rot.	Ditto.
306	Jam. to Lon.	Ditto.
307	Waterf. to Barb.	Ditto.
308	Virg. to Lon.	Do.
309	Ditto to Whitehaven,	Do.
310	Limmerick to Rotterd.	Do.
311	Cork to St. Chris. ran- } som'd 1600 l. }	
312	Newf. to Lond.	Bilboa,
313	Antigua to Lon.	Ditto.
314	Newf. to Port.	Ditto.

Thus I have given the Reader as compleat, and as exact a List, I believe, of the *British* Merchant-Ships taken since the beginning of this War, as any that can be made up without the Assistance of Public Authority. In this List I have inserted no Ship, by Name, or otherwise, but such as our Merchants and Insurers have had Advice of being taken; and where the first Advices were afterwards contradicted by those of the Ship's Arrival, or of her being lost, I have taken Care to leave her out of my List. Nay, even when the Ship, at first reported to be taken, was never afterwards heard of, I have left her out; because I supposed she had either foundered at Sea, or was sunk, or destroy'd by the Enemy's Privateers; tho' in this last Case, the Loss must be allowed to be owing to the War, and to the Number of Privateers which have been *permitted* to traverse the Ocean: But because I could not distinguish by which of these two Accidents the Ship was lost, I have left all such out of the Question, being unwilling to swell the Account of my Country's Losses with Uncertainties; and even this Account, certain and surprising as it is, I should not have published, if it had not been with a View to promote that which alone can prevent the like Losses for the future, I mean a *Parliamentary Enquiry* into the Conduct of the War, both by Land and Sea.

If

If either House of Parliament were to appoint such a Secret Committee *as should be agreeable to* the Merchants and Insurers; and to empower that Committee to send for Persons, Papers, and Records, a more compleat and authentic List of our Losses might be drawn up; the true Causes of them might be discovered; and, by the Advice of the Merchants, *who, in this Case, are the best Judges*, proper Methods might be taken to prevent the like Misfortunes in Time to come: for, so far as I can learn, I do not find that those whose Duty it was, have ever once consulted with the Merchants, either about the proper Seasons for sending out Convoys, or the proper Stations for our Cruisers. If they have neglected to do so, I hope the Parliament will take Care to do it for them, and appoint proper Persons for that Purpose; for if the Trade and Navigation of *Great-Britain* be not a Subject worthy of *Parliamentary Concern*, I do not know what Subject is. Some People may, perhaps, imagine, our Parliaments have nothing to do, besides that of granting Money, and making Penal Laws for levying those Grants; but I may venture to prophesy, if this Maxim should prevail for *Twenty Years* to come, as it seems to have done for *Twenty Years* past, if our Parliaments should continue to leave the Care of our Trade and Navigation entirely to our Ministers,

F

nisters, the Nation will soon have little or no Money for them to grant. Ministers always have their Heads so full of *their own Trade*, that we never can expect they will mind the *Trade* of the Nation; and therefore I am certain, no Parliament will ever leave the Care of our Trade entirely to Ministers, unless the Majority of the Members be such as make a *Trade* of the *Trust* reposed in them by their Country.

For this Reason, I do not in the least question the next Session of Parliament's enquiring strictly into the Conduct of the War; and from that Inquiry we may expect an authentic List of the Number, Tonnage, and Value of the Ships taken by or from the Enemy; but 'till that happens, I shall beg Leave to make some Remarks upon the foregoing List, and upon the *deceitful* Account of Profit and Loss published by our Ministerial Hirelings. The foregoing List of Ships taken and seized from the Beginning of *August*, 1739, when Reprisals against us were published in *Spain* *, or rather from the 1st of *September*, to the End of *October*, 1741, which is not above Twenty Six or Seven Months, will shew, that there have been in the whole 314 *British* Ships taken and seized; of which there have been but *Eight* retaken, *Five* discharged conditionally, and *One* ransomed, as we may

* See *Annals of Europe* for 1739. Vol. I. p. 143.
suppose,

suppose, at near the full Value; so that our Merchants have lost entirely 300 Ships, paid 1600 *l.* for the 301st, and what they paid for releasing the Five is not yet known; therefore we may reckon the Nation has, by this List, lost 301 Merchant-Ships; and all of them, I think, except one, with Cargoes on board.

Now, tho' I have not put a Value upon any one of these Ships, yet, in general, some Guess may be made of our Loss. For this Purpose, I shall suppose every Ship and Cargo, one with another, to be worth 3500 *l.* At this Rate, the Value of the *British* Merchant-Ships seized, taken, or destroyed by the Enemy, amounts to 1,053,500 *l.* Sterling. To this we must add the Loss we have sustained by our Seamen's being taken, and kept Prisoners by the Enemy, which will be a very great Addition to the Value of our Loss, and is a most grievous Misfortune to the Nation, considering our present great Scarcity of Seamen, and the oppressive Methods we are forced to make use of for manning His Majesty's Navy.

I shall not pretend to put a Value upon *British* Seamen, because I think them unvaluable. But what can we think of a *Hireling* that pretends to give an Account of our Losses by the War, and forgets to bring in to the Account, the vast Number of Seamen we have lost by the Captures. We must

from thence conclude, that this Loss is never so much as thought of among those he converses with; and consequently, that those who set him to Work *never think* of our Seamen, but when they are *contriving* Methods to *oppress* them. If we should allow but *Twelve* Seamen to every Merchant-Ship that has been taken, the Number of *British* Seamen now in the Enemy's Hands would amount to 3612 Men; but as many of them have, *at the Peril of their Lives*, made their Escape from the Enemy, and as the *Spanish* Privateers have sometimes set the Crew on Shoar, when they had more Prisoners than they could safely venture to detain, I shall reckon but 3000 now in the Hands of the Enemy; and most of these we must suppose to be rotting in *Spanish* Jails, or already starved to Death, or forced by *meer Want*, or *Torture*, to list themselves in the Service of the Enemy, and thereby increase the Number of those Privateers that are employed to destroy the Trade of their Country. What Methods have been taken to redeem from Bondage those honest and brave Seamen that have had Virtue and Resolution enough to withstand the *great Temptations* they are offered on one Hand, and the *terrible Sufferings* they are exposed to on the other, I do not know; for I have not heard that any Cartel has as yet been settled, or that any Exchange

has

has been made; but on our Side, I am sure, it ought not to have been neglected or delayed, because there is no Comparison between the Worth of a *British* and that of a *Spanish* Sailor.

Will any Man suppose, that this Loss of Seamen, at a Time when we stand so much in need of such Men, is no Loss to the Nation? Would any Man, but a *Ministerial Hireling*, forget to reckon this as a Part of our National Loss by the War? And yet, without reckoning this Loss, I believe, it will appear, that by the most probable and reasonable Suppositions, we are far from being Gainers, upon a fair Account of *Profit and Loss*. The Supposition I have made, that each Ship and Cargo taken from us, one with another, was worth 3500 *l.* cannot, I think, be looked on as unreasonable or extravagant, especially if we consider, that a great Number of the Ships we have lost, were large Ships, and most of these Ships loaded with valuable Cargoes; which is the Case with respect to most large Ships, employed in the *Portugal, Italian, Turkey, African, or American Trade*: This, indeed, would appear to be very much an Under-Rate, if any Credit were to be given to the Accounts from *Spain*; for they computed the first Forty Seven Ships they took from us at the Beginning of the War, to be worth 234000 *l.* which

which is above 5000 *l.* *per* Ship and Cargo, one with another *. But as the *Ministers* are the *sole Masters* of the *Press* in *Spain*; and as *Ministers* and *Ministerial Writers* are, in all Countries, apt to exaggerate the Nation's Gains, and conceal or under-value its Losses by a War, in order to extoll or justify their own Conduct, without Regard to this *Spanish* Valuation, I shall compute our Ships and Cargoes at no more than 3500 *l.* each; and, according to this Computation, 301 Ships makes, as I have said, 1,053,500 *l.* to which I shall add but 50000 *l.* as the Value of the Houses, Goods, and Effects of our Merchants seized in *Spain*, contrary to the Faith of Treaties, at the breaking out of the War; which, I have been informed, is the lowest Value can be put upon this Loss, notwithstanding the Boldness of the *Author's Friend*, mentioned in his *Postscript*, who would (tho' perhaps not worth a *Groat*, besides his *Pension* from the *Minister*) undertake to insure all the Loss there could be on this Account at 8000 *l.*

Thus our Loss in Ships, Goods, and Effects, for this is far from being our only Loss by the War, appears to be 1,103,500 *l.* and now to Ballance this with our Gains. As I have no Account of the Ships taken from the Enemy, either by our Men of War or Pri-

* See *Annals of Europe*, for 1739. Vol. II. p. 89.

vateers, I must take the Account given by my Author, *lame as it is*, and upon this Account I shall make a few Observations, which will very much diminish the total Amount. But before I begin with any of his Articles, I shall, in general, observe, that as such an Author might certainly have had free Access to all our Offices, he might have given us an authentic Account, if he had not been *resolved to deceive*. At the *Court of Admiralty* they certainly have a List of all the Prizes that have been brought in to be condemned here *at Home*; and at the *Board of Admiralty* they certainly have, or at least they ought, I think, to have regular Accounts transmitted to them from all our *Courts of Admiralty Abroad*, of all Prizes brought there to be condemned. From these two Offices therefore, a *Ministerial Author* might certainly have had an authentic Account of the Names and Tonnage of all Prizes taken from the Enemy, before *July* last. And as all Prizes are, or ought to be, immediately sold by public Auction, for the Benefit of the Captors, the Government, I think, ought to have an Account of all such Sales, in order to take Care, that the poor Seamen are not cheated by their Officers and Agents. If the Government has any such Account, this Author might certainly have had it; and therefore I must likewise suppose, that he might have

have had an *authentic Account* of the *Value* of each Prize, if he had not been *resolved* to *impose* upon the Publick, by a false and deceitful Account, both of the *Number* of Prizes, and the *Value* of each.

However, I shall take his Account as it stands, and object against those Articles only, that glaringly appear to be false or deceitful. Among these, the most impudent, and therefore the First, I shall take Notice of is, that of his charging to the Profit of *England*, the Damage we have done to the Enemy, without gaining *One Shilling* Advantage to ourselves. This is such a glaring Imposition, that I am surprized any Minister, or Ministerial Writer, could suppose the People *filly enough* to swallow it down. But to set this Piece of Deceit in its true Light, I shall suppose, that *C. D.* a Merchant, is cheated in a Parcel of Goods, by *A. B.* another Merchant, to the Value of 100 *l.* and that in Revenge *C. D.* beats and bruises *A. B.* in such a manner, that it will, as he supposes, cost *A. B.* at least 150 *l.* to Physicians, Surgeons, and Apothecaries for his Cure. Then I shall suppose, that *C. D.* goes home gravely, and in his *Account of Profit and Loss*, writes down thus.

A. B.

<i>A. B. to C. D. Dr.</i>		<i>per Contr. Cr.</i>	
By Loss upon a damaged Parcel of Goods bought of said <i>A. B.</i>	} £. 100.	By my beating and bruising said <i>A. B.</i> in Revenge	} £. 150
	100		150
To Ballance due to <i>A. B.</i>	} 50		

Would not the World laugh at this Article? Would not they look upon *C. D.* as an arrant Fool? Yet this is the very Case, as this Author has stated it, between us and *Spain*. But if this *C. D.* should afterwards have an Action of Assault and Battery brought against him, and by the Judgment should be obliged to pay 250*l.* Costs and Damages, how then would his Account of Profit and Loss stand? Would it not stand all Loss, and no Profit? I shall not say that this will be the Case between *Spain* and us: I shall not say, that we must at last pay for repairing those Forts and Castles we have destroyed: But what has been, may be: It is not easy to tell what an *able Negotiator* may do, or what may be the Consequence of our next Convention with *Spain*, especially if that Con-

vention should be the Consequence of a *French Mediation*, or a *G-----n Neutrality*.

By this Time, I believe, every Reader will see, that great Deductions must be made from this Author's Account of Profit. In the great Articles of *La Plata*, *Porto Bello*, *Chagra*, and *Carthagena*, we must reckon only what we got, and not what we destroyed; and with Regard to Ships and Privateers, we must reckon only those we took, and not those we destroyed. To begin with *Port Plata*, the Accounts of that Affair say, that Cap. *Hall* got only above the Value of 6000 *l.* * and I have been told, he did not get so much. However, I shall allow him to have got full 6000 *l.* and therefore deduct from this Article of our Profit no more than 74000 *l.*

The next Article I shall take Notice of, is *Porto Bello*. By the Admiral's Account of this Affair, which the Reader may see in the *Annals* for that Year, Vol. I. p. 385, there was no Ransom so much as demanded, so that we got only 10000 *Dollars*, Three Ships, a few Brass Cannon, &c. and some Ammunition, the whole Value of which I shall state at 12000 *l.* and therefore from this Article of our Profit, I shall deduct no more than 88000 *l.*

* See *Annals of Europe*, Vol. I. p. 396.

The *Chagra* Article comes next. Here, indeed, our People got a good Booty, which, as I have been told, amounted to about 150000 *l.* and therefore, from this Article I shall deduct but 50000 *l.*

As to the *Carthagera* Article, the Reader may review the Account in the *Gazette* of *May* the 19th, and that of *June* the 20th, by which he will see, we got nothing by that Expedition, tho' we did the Enemy a great deal of Damage; and therefore, from this Article of our Profit I must deduct the whole, *viz.* 463000 *l.*

The next Article of the same Kind relates to the Privateers said by our Author to be sunk or destroy'd. A Privateer taken is some Profit, as well as an Advantage to our Trade, but a Privateer sunk or destroyed is no Profit, tho' it be an Advantage to our Trade; therefore all the Sums charged to our Profit, upon account of Privateers or Ships destroy'd, must be deducted, which, in the whole, amount to 3700 *l.*

As to the other Articles which I shall take Notice of, they are rather to be called false than deceitful; and of these the first is, a *French* Ship with a *Spanish* Pass, taken by Admiral *Haddock*, and valued at 5000 *l.* This Ship was discharged, after taking out a Packet belonging to the Court of *Spain*, which I never heard contained any Jewels or Things

of Value.* Therefore we must, upon this Account, deduct 5000 *l*.

The next is the *Spanish* Ships seized in Port, and valued at 18000 *l*. This is really a Charge, and a false Charge too, brought by this Author's *blundering Ignorance*, against his *Friends*; for tho' the *Spanish* Government seized the Ships and Effects of our Merchants in *Spain*, contrary to the Law of Nations, and the Faith of Treaties, it would have been wrong in our Government, especially as we are a Trading Nation, to have follow'd their Example. Foreign Ships or Merchants trading in our Dominions, are under the Protection of our Honour, and cannot be seized or stopt, without a Breach of Honour, as well as Treaty. In this we ought to follow the Example of the *Dutch* in our King *Charles* the Second's Reign; for tho' that King, upon his Declaration of War in the Year 1672, ordered all the *Dutch* Ships in our Harbours to be seized, and made Prize of; and tho' the *Dutch*, irritated by this Treatment, ordered some *British* Ships in their Harbours to be stopt, yet, upon better Consideration, and out of Regard to their own Honour, as well as Trade, they ordered them all to be set at Liberty. This Example, I say, we ought always to follow; and, if I am rightly informed, our Ministers did very wisely

* See *Annals of Europe*, Vol. I. p. 187.

and honourably follow it, upon Occasion of the present War with *Spain*; for tho' some *Spanish* Ships were stopt in our Harbours at the Beginning of the War, yet, I believe, they were afterwards set at Liberty; at least, I could never hear of their being condemned, therefore I shall not do our Ministers the *Injustice* to charge this Article to our Account of Profit by the War; for I shall always be ready to *applaud* the Conduct of *our Ministers*, when I think they deserve it, and for the sake of my Country, I wish I could upon all Occasions do so. For this Reason, I must deduct this whole Sum of 18000*l.* from the Creditor Side of our Account, as my Author has stated it.

Another Article of the same Nature, is a very surprising one. My Author tells us of a Ship with 100000 *Pieces of Eight*, and Cloathing for the Garrison of *St. Augustine*, taken by the *Diamond*, Capt. *Knowles*, valued at 70000*l.* I wish, for the Captain's sake, who very well deserves it, this were a true Article; but as the Garrison of *St. Augustine* does not, I believe, consist of above 1000 Men, their Cloathing cannot be reckoned worth above 5000*l.* and as 100000 *Pieces of Eight* is but 22500*l. Sterling*, we cannot reckon this Ship and Cargo at above 30000*l.* therefore I must deduct, on Account of this Article, 40000*l.*

The

The Third false Article I shall take Notice of is, the *Princessa* Man of War, which our Author values at 60000*l.* This Ship, as I have been informed, was bought for the Service of the Government, at 15000*l.* and, as I must suppose, the Government paid at least the full Value, I must therefore, upon Account of this Article, deduct 45000*l.*

Thus the Deductions to be made from this Author's Account of our Profit by the War will stand as follows, viz.

	£.
<i>Port Plata</i> - - -	74,000
<i>Porto Bello,</i> - - -	88,000
<i>Fort Chagra,</i> - - -	50,000
<i>Carthagena,</i> - - -	463,000
Privateers and Ships destroyed,	3,700
The <i>French</i> Ship, - -	5,000
The <i>Spanish</i> Ships seized here,	18,000
The <i>St. Augustine</i> Ship, -	40,000
The <i>Princessa</i> Man of War,	45,000

Sum Total to be deducted, -- 786,700

Now, if 786,700*l.* be deducted from 1,617,400*l.* which is the Sum Total of our Profit, by this Author's Account, there will remain but 830,700*l.* which is the highest our Profit by the War can be reckoned to amount to, even supposing that he is right in all his other Articles of Profit; and as I have before

before shewn, that we have already lost by Captures and Seizures at least 1,103,500 *l.* the Ballance is 272,800 *l.* against us, instead of being 1,005,400 *l.* in our Favour, which, I believe, is far from having been made good to us by the Ships we have taken from the Enemy, since this Author closed his Account.

I know it may be said, that by destroying the Forts at *Porto Bello* and *Chagra* we have opened a Trade with the *Spanish* Settlements in *America*, which will be a real and an annual Profit to the Nation; but as we have, at the same Time, laid open this Trade to the *French*, *Dutch*, and *Danes*, and as their Ships meet with no Interruption in their Passage from *Europe* to *America*, I believe, our Share in this Trade will be but very small; and let it be never so great, it will be much more than over-ballanced, by the Total Interruption of our Trade with *Old Spain*, and by the Load which the Increase of Freight and Insurance has thrown upon every other Branch of our Trade.

To these Losses I must add the Expence we are at in maintaining 12000 *Danish* and *Hessian* Troops; for this is a National Loss, because it is every *Shilling* sent out of the Kingdom, for the Support of Foreigners; and this Loss I must impute to our War with *Spain*, because I dare not presume any other

other Reason for our putting ourselves to this Expence. I shall indeed grant, that it is impossible for me to shew, how these Troops can be of any Use to us in a War with *Spain*, considering that by Stipulation we are not to employ them in attacking the Enemy, either in *Old Spain*, or in *America*; and we could not, I think, suppose, that a Subsidy Treaty with the King of *Denmark*, or Prince of *Hesse*, would intimidate *France*, and thereby prevent her joining with *Spain* against us. For this Purpose, I am convinced, that the same Expence laid out in encreasing our Navy, would have had a much stronger Effect; for we must not pretend to frighten *France* by our Land Armies, unless we could form such a Confederacy against her, as the late King *William* formed a little before his Death. That wise Prince did not begin his grand Design by Subsidy-Treaties with the lesser Powers of *Europe*: He began it by a close Confederacy between the Three principal Powers; and that Confederacy soon drew into it such a Number of the lesser Powers, as put an End to the ambitious Views of *France*, and at last fixed the Liberties of *Europe* upon a Foundation, which could be shaken by nothing but the *Fatality of this Nation*.

I have said nothing of the great Expence the Nation is put to, by maintaining such a Number of additional Forces, both by Sea and
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and Land; because this Expence is wholly laid out among ourselves, and for the Support of our own People; tho' even this deserves Consideration, and ought to be a Reason for our pushing the War with *as much Vigour*, in order to make it of *as short Duration*, as possible.

I am sorry I have been obliged to set our Profit and Loss by the War in so clear a Light. If no Attempt had been made to impose upon the People, in order to excuse our past Conduct; or if I had thought it impossible to diminish our Loss, or increase our Profit, in Time to come, I should not have undertaken such an ungrateful Task. But a public Imposition I cannot bear; and as I am convinced, that our Loss might have been, in a great measure, prevented, that our Profits might have been vastly enhanced, and that by a Change of Conduct, the Enemy may still be obliged to sue for Peace, I could not avoid detecting the Imposition, because, I thought, it might contribute towards producing that Change in our Conduct, by which alone the Cloud can be dissipated that is now gathering against this Nation, and will certainly overwhelm us, if we do not immediately begin to provide against it, by a wise, a bold, and a steady Conduct, which, *from Experience* we may conclude, is not to be

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expected from those who have *hitherto* had the chief Direction of the present War.

Could any Man have imagined in *July*, 1739, that in *November*, 1741, we should have had Reason to complain of having had above 300 of our Merchant-ships taken by such an impotent Enemy, and of our having never so much as once attempted to disturb them in *Old Spain*, or to take and hold Possession of any of their considerable Settlements in *America*? Yet this is the Case: By the List of Captures I have given, it appears, that in less than Twenty Six Months Time, they have taken and seized 301 *British* Merchant-Ships; and that of these a most surprising Number has been taken in the *Channel*, and upon our own Coasts, either in *Europe*, or *North America*.

I know that some People have boasted much of the great Care taken of our Trade in the *Mediterranean*. I shall be far from derogating from the Conduct and Care of the Gentleman who has the Command of our Squadron there. I believe he has done all that was in his Power, and would have done a great deal more for the Honour and Service of his Country, as well as for the Safety of the Merchants, if he had been provided with a sufficient Number of small Ships, &c. and with proper Instructions. But if all Circumstances

stances be considered, we have no great Reason to boast of the small Loss we have met with even in the *Mediterranean*.

With regard to the *Mediterranean*, we must consider, that small *Spanish* Privateers dare not venture out into that Sea, because they are liable to be pick'd up by the *Barbary Corsairs*, as well as by our Men of War; and considering the Narrowness of that Sea, our having Possession of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*, and our having all the Ports of *France*, *Italy*, *Sicily*, *Sardinia*, and *Corfica* open to us, it is surprising, that any one of the Enemy's Privateers could live for a Week in any Part of the *Mediterranean*; especially considering, that our small Ships designed for clearing the Seas of those Vermin, were, neither there, nor any where else, exposed to the Danger of being met with, and overpowered by the Enemy's Men of War.

After having considered these Circumstances, let us examine the foregoing List, and calculate how many of our Merchant-ships have been taken in the *Mediterranean*; for we must suppose, that every Ship carried into any Port within the *Straits Mouth*, was taken in that Sea; and from this Calculation it will appear, that about *Thirty British* Ships have been taken and made Prize of in that Part of the World alone, besides those we have had no Account where they were car-

ried, or perhaps no Account of their being taken, which may be the Case with respect to several Ships bound from our *Plantations* directly to the *Mediterranean*. This, I say, is a surprising Number, considering all Circumstances; and is, I am sure, no Sign that our Trade has been taken so great Care of in the *Mediterranean*, as it ought to have been, or as some People boast of; for as our Ships bound to or from *Italy* or *Turkey* are generally rich Ships, a more than ordinary Care ought to have been taken of our Trade in that Part of the World.

If it had been impossible to prevent the Losses we have met with: If we had done all that was in our Power for preventing them, it would be some Alleviation to the Sorrow of our injured Merchants; but that there has been a Neglect or Misconduct somewhere, is evident from the *very Excuses* that are made for them. When any Misfortune happens, it is usual, it is even natural for every Man to endeavour to shift the Load of it from his own Shoulders; and accordingly, with regard to Cruisers, it is said, that a sufficient Number has, from Time to Time, been appointed, but that the Captains have not been enough diligent and watchful upon their several Stations. Whether this be true or no, I cannot pretend to answer; but I cannot believe there has been the least Neglect in any
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of our Captains, not only because of the good Opinion I have of our *Seamen* and *Sea-Officers* in general, but because I have not heard of any Officer's having been *punished*, or so much as *reprimanded* for such a Neglect.

Then with regard to *Convoys*, it is said, that proper and sufficient *Convoys* have been appointed from Time to Time, or as often as there was Occasion for them; but that the Merchant-Ships could not be prevailed on to wait for them, and thus by sailing *without Convoy*, they exposed themselves to Danger, which has been the chief Occasion of so many of them being taken. This likewise is a Question, which I shall not pretend to answer; but this I know, that Merchant-Ships are often obliged to sail *without Convoy*, in order to come in Time to the proper Market for their Cargo. This they did in the War in Queen *Anne's* Reign *: This they must do in all Wars; and as in this Case, they have nothing but *Cruisers* to trust to for their Safety, therefore Care should be taken, not only to appoint *Cruisers* in all proper Stations, but to oblige them to continue in their Stations, during the whole Course of their appointed Time.

* See Collection of Parliamentary Debates, printed for *Torbuck*, Vol. V. p. 214.

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That Merchants must often fail *without Convoy* is what, I say, must frequently happen in every War; but in the present War, their being obliged to fail *without Convoy*, might have been almost entirely prevented. In the War in Queen *Anne's* Reign, we could not well appoint *Convoys* to sail, *at certain Times and Seasons*, to any Place in the World; because the *French* had always small Squadrons of Men of War lying at *Dunkirk, Brest, and Toulon*, and would have intercepted most (as they did many) of our *Convoys*, if they had known the particular Times of their sailing: But in this War, we were in no such Danger; and therefore, at the very Beginning of it, a certain and regular Course of *Convoys* ought, by the Advice of our Merchants, to have been settled to and from every Place with which we have any considerable Trade; and this Course ought to have been published, that our Merchants might take Notice of it, and prepare their Ships accordingly.

The Third *Excuse* made for our Losses at Sea, is a little inconsistent with the other Two. It is said, we could not get Men sufficient for manning such a Number of Ships of War as were necessary for the Defence of our Dominions at Home and Abroad, and for the Protection of our Trade by *Cruisers* and *Convoys*.

Convoys. If this was the Case, I believe I may venture to say, it was our own Fault, for these Reasons. First, considering the Treatment our *Sailors* had for *several Years* before met with, we did not, in the Beginning of the War, give Encouragement enough, either to Seamen or Landmen, to enter into His Majesty's Sea Service. Secondly, as we had, at the Beginning of the War, a standing Army sufficient not only for our Defence at Home, but for attacking the Enemy Abroad, we began too soon to raise Recruits and new Regiments for the Land Service; by which Means many able-bodied Landmen were engaged in that Service, who otherwise would have entered themselves on board our Men of War. And Thirdly, we not only fitted out, but Commissioned and Manned, a much greater Number of large Ships than we had any Occasion for in a War with *Spain*; which, even for the Sake of the Expence, ought to have been avoided; and much more ought it to have been avoided, if we thereby rendered ourselves destitute of Men for our *Cruisers* and *Convoys*; because, by so doing, we left ourselves open to the Enemy, in the only Place where they could hope to hurt us.

I know, it is said by way of Answer to this last Objection, that we were in Danger of an *Invasion* from *France* as well as *Spain*, and therefore were obliged to keep a large Squadron

Squadron of capital Ships always ready in the Channel. I likewise know, that both the *French* and the *Spaniards* plaid many conjuring *Tricks* to possess us with *this Fear*, which, *we have shewn them*, we are but too much subject to. The *Spaniards*, at the Beginning of the War, assembled an Army in *Gallicia*, gave the Command of it to an *Irish* Man, and sent for the late unfortunate Duke of *Ormond*. The *French* fitted out a Squadron at *Brest*, and sent small Ships to sound several Parts of our Coast. But every Man of Sense saw through the Meaning of these Grimaces. However general our *Discontents* may be, the Spirit of *Jacobitism* has so much subsided, that neither the *Spaniards* nor the *French* will dare to *invade* us with a *small Force*, and against a *great one* we shall always have Time to *provide*, before they can sufficiently *prepare*.

For this Reason, we should have *despised* their *artful Threatnings*, provided for the *Safety* of our Trade, and *pursued* the *Enemy* with Vigour, which would have put an End to all our *Discontents*; and this would have been a *surer*, and a much *cheaper* Defence against an *Invasion*, than any Army we can keep up, or Squadron we can fit out. We might, and, indeed, ought to have fitted out, and made ready for Service, a sufficient Number of Capital Ships; but it was need-
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less to Commission them, and much more needful to provide them with their Complement of Men. If we had spread the Channel, the Coasts of *Ireland*, and the Bay of *Biscay*, with *Cruisers*, large and small, we should have had the Men on board them always at a Call, and with them we might have manned out a Squadron of Capital Ships, superior to any both *France* and *Spain* could have brought against us, as soon as we found we had a real and necessary Occasion for such a Squadron. From hence, I must think, we were in no want of Seamen for any sort of Service, because ever since the War began, we have had a great Number of *large*, some of them the *largest* Ships, lying full manned in the Channel, without being of any Use, I know of, but a great Charge to the Nation.

I can therefore find *no Excuse* for our being destitute of a sufficient Number of *Cruisers* and *Convoys* in any Part of the World; and if we have had a sufficient Number, I can no way account for such a Multitude of Ships being taken from our Merchants. The Number is so extraordinary, considering the Enemy we have to deal with, that, I am sure, the Conduct of our Admiralty *now*, deserves as much to be inquired into by Parliament, as it did *in the Year 1707*. The Number of our Ships taken was then, indeed, much larger than it is now: It was larger even in

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Proportion to the Time; but as the Encouragement the Enemy's Privateers have met with, will certainly increase their Number, and draw Men from all Nations into their Service, if we take no better Care of our Trade in Time to come, than we have done in Time past, I am convinced, that at the End of Five Years War, (and the present will, I dare say, be of longer Continuance, unless, in the mean Time, we prosecute it with more Vigour, or submit to a dishonourable Peace) we shall now have more Merchant-Ships taken from us by *Spain alone*, than we then had by *France and Spain together*; and if we compare our Circumstances in *This War* with our Circumstances in *That*, the Number of Ships we have already lost will appear vastly surprising.

In *That War*, the Enemy had such a powerful Navy, that the *Dutch* and we were obliged to send out Squadrons of Fifty or Sixty Line of Battle Ships, besides Gallies, &c. of which we furnished a Third, to encounter them at Sea: Whereas in *This War*, whilst *France* continues Neuter, we shall have no Occasion to send out any Squadron of above Fifteen or Sixteen Line of Battle Ships. In *That War* our *small Cruisers* were every where in continual Danger of being pick'd up by *French Men of War*; and our *Convoys* were often defeated and taken, with the Merchant-

Merchant-Ships under their Care, by *French* Squadrons; whereas in *This* we have scarcely any such Thing to fear. In *That* War, the Enemy were in Possession of one Side of the Channel, from one End to the other; for *Ostend* was not taken 'till 1706: whereas in *This*, we have no Enemy near the Channel, and all the Ports upon both Sides open to us, which either our Cruisers or Merchant-Ships may safely put into, in case of Danger, either from the Seas, or the Enemy. In *That* War, or at least for the first Two or Three Years of it, the Coasts of *France*, *Spain*, and *Naples*, with the Islands of *Sicily*, *Sardinia*, *Majorca*, *Minorca*, and *Yvica*, were in the Enemy's Hands: whereas in *This*, the Coasts of *France* and *Naples*, and the Islands of *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, are in neutral Hands; and *Gibraltar* at the Mouth of the *Mediterranean*, with *Minorca* in the Middle of it, are in our own. To this I must add, that we were then in much greater Danger of an Invasion than now; because there were more *Jacobites* in all the Three Kingdoms, and the Kingdom of *Scotland* was so far from being united to *England*, that a Rupture between the Two seemed unavoidable, in case the Queen had happened to die. Yet our Government did not then think it necessary to keep a Squadron continually in Commission, for guarding against that Danger: They took

a much cheaper, and an equally safe Course, by keeping a proper Number of Ships always ready for Service ; and the Event in 1708 shewed, that if we had at that Time been *invaded*, it was not for want of a Squadron sufficient to defeat the Enemy, but for want of due Intelligence ; which surely cannot now be our Case, considering what vast Sums have of late Years been charged and allowed for *Secret Service*.

After considering all these Circumstances, would any one imagine, that there is the least Proportion between the Number of Merchant-Ships taken from us by Privateers in *This* War, and the Number taken from us by Privateers in *That* ; and yet, upon comparing them together, we shall find the former comes pretty near to the latter. With Regard to the Number of Merchant-Ships taken from us in the first *Five* Years, or *Four* Years and *a Half* of that War, we have an authentic Account of it ; for in the Session of Parliament 1707, 1708. upon a Complaint of the Merchants, the House of Lords appointed a Committee to inquire into the Conduct of the Admiralty, and by their Report it appears not to have been a *sham Committee of Inquiry*. In that Report, the Number of Ships lost is said to be 1146, which is at the Rate of 254 a Year ; but as a great Number of these Ships were not taken by Privateers, but by

by defeating our Convoys, which has never once happened to us in *This War*, we must, upon this Account, make a Deduction; and for settling the *Quantum* of this Deduction, I shall have Recourse to the same Report, where it is shewn, that in one Year, from *June 1706*, to *June 1707*, above *Sixty Ships*, we may compute at least *Sixty Five* were taken, by defeating our *Convoys*; therefore I shall fix the *Quantum* of this Deduction at *Fifty Ships* a Year, so that the Number taken Yearly, in *that heavy War*, by Privateers, cannot be computed at above 204, one Year with another. Now as the Number of Ships taken in *this trifling War* appears to be 301, from the Beginning of *September 1739*, to the End of *October 1741*, which is 26 Months, the Number taken Yearly, by Privateers alone, must be computed at 139.

Thus we see that the Proportion between the Number of Ships taken by Privateers in this War, and the Number taken in the late War, stands near as *Three to Four*, which must appear very surprising to one who considers the several Circumstances I have mentioned. But I must observe, that of the 314 Ships seized and taken in this War, there was but 143 of them actually taken by Privateers, (the rest having been seized in the Ports of *Spain*) within the First Fourteen Months, and in the last Twelve Months there
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has been 161, all taken by Privateers; so that in the last Twelvemonth, there has been more taken than in the preceeding Fourteen Months; and if we do not alter our Conduct, I believe, the Number of our Ships taken will every Year *increase*, 'till at last it begins to *decrease*, not for want of *Spanish* Privateers to take, but for want of *British* Ships to be taken.

Whether there has been any Misconduct in our Naval Affairs; whether the prodigious Naval Force the Nation is now at the Expence of maintaining, has been misapplied; or whether the Captains appointed to Cruise have been negligent in their Duty, is none of my Business to determine. But sure I am, that upon comparing our Circumstances in *This* War, with our Circumstances in the late War, and the Number of our Ships taken in *This*, with the Number of our Ships taken by Privateers in *That*, there is now greater Reason to suspect Misconduct, than there was in the Year 1707, and consequently greater Cause for a *Parliamentary Inquiry*, than there was at that Time.

In that Year, the injured Merchants no sooner presented their Petition to the House of Lords, than that House began to shew a proper and a just Indignation for the Sufferings of their Country. Tho' Prince George of Denmark was then Lord High Admiral,
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yet, notwithstanding his high Rank, notwithstanding his near Relation to the Queen, they, *without Ceremony*, appointed an impartial Committee, such a one as could not be suspected of any close Attachment to the then Ministers, to enquire into the Affair; and that Committee did accordingly, *with as little Ceremony*, inquire strictly into what was so recommended to them, as will appear from their Report, with the Lord High Admiral's Answer, and their Reply; all which the Reader may see at full Length in the Vth Volume of *Torbuick's Parliamentary Debates*. What was the Consequence? The Prince's Council, as Lord High Admiral, was to a Man removed, and a much better, tho' I cannot say the best, Care was taken of our Trade during the rest of that War. For it is an Observation of our Government, an Observation that never has failed, that never will fail, When our Parliaments do their Duty, every Minister, every Officer will do his; but when our Parliaments shew themselves neglectful of their Duty, our Ministers, our Officers, from the Highest to the Lowest, are apt to be neglectful of theirs, or to make a bad Use of the Powers with which they are invested.

I therefore hope to see the Complaints of our Merchants strictly and impartially inquired into in next Session of Parliament; and
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all necessary Lights given for that Purpose. A *simple Address* will not do. In this War we find it has not done. In the last, it produced but little Effect. In 1704 the House of Lords presented an Address to the late Queen upon this Subject, which, indeed, produced some Effect; for Two active Officers were immediately sent out to *Cruise*, and they continued *cruising* from January 1704-5, to October following. I say Two active Officers, whom to their Honour I must name, Sir George Byng, and Sir John Jennings; for in that Time they took no less than Twenty of the Enemy's best and stoutest Privateers; but this was all the Effect it produced; for the very next Year our Trade was as much neglected as ever. In this War, the Parliament has already addressed upon this Subject *. What Effect it has produced I do not know. If it has produced any, I am sure our *Cruisers* have had very bad Luck; considering the Number of *Privateers* that are out, and the Danger they must be in of being taken, going out from, or returning to their few Ports, if our *Cruisers* have been properly stationed.

But before I conclude, I must observe, that our Case is now very different from what it was in 1707. Our Trade was at that Time too much neglected, and, perhaps,

* See Votes of Monday 24th of March, 1739. p. 37.

we did not make all the Use of our Naval Force, which we might and ought to have done; but our Squadrons had in that War performed several glorious Exploits, which were of great Service to their Country, and our Success at Land had been glorious and successful beyond Expectation. *In this War* can it be said, that any of our Squadrons, except that under the Direction of Admiral *Vernon*, who is supposed not to be under *the same Influence with others*, have performed glorious Exploits? Can it be said, that we have carried on any War at Land with Success? The only Land Expeditions we have attempted, is that against *Carthagena*, and that against *St. Augustine*. As to the latter, my designed Brevity obliges me to pass it over in Silence, tho' I hope it will not be so passed over *in another Place*; but as to the former, there arises Two Questions which ought to be enquired into, because at first View our Conduct appears to have been wrong. The First, How we came to attack that Place at all? and the Second, How we came to be so late in going upon that Expedition?

As to the First, I shall grant, that if the *Spanish* Squadron had been still there, we should have had some Reason to attack the Place, if it had been only to destroy that Squadron; but as we knew that Squadron

was failed; as the Place was known to be the most unwholesome of all the *Spanish* Settlements in *America*; as the destroying it could be of very little Advantage to our Trade; as the keeping it would have been Madness, considering the Inclemency of the Climate, and the little Advantage it could be of to the Nation; I can find no Reason for attacking it, unless we were then resolved to attack no Place which the Nation could propose to hold; because the Nation's insisting upon holding what it had got, might have made the Negotiation for a *new Convention* a little difficult.

And as to the Second Question, from the Accounts published in our own *Gazettes* it appears, that the Reason why we did not erect a Battery against *Fort Lazare* was, because the Rainy Season was approaching so near, that it would not admit of the Time necessary for raising a Cannon Battery. If we had raised such a Battery, and had been provided with skilful Engineers and Gunners, we might soon have made a practicable Breach in such an insignificant Fort, or at least we might have razed the Parapet, and thereby prevented the Enemy from being covered when they fired upon our Troops as they approached, which would have saved the Lives of many a brave *British* Subject, and prevented the Dishonour of a Repulse.

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We certainly knew when the Rainy Season was to approach, why then was not Admiral *Vernon* enabled to go upon this Expedition so early as to have Time to attack the Place in Form, and carry it, before the Rainy Season came on? I am sure, no Delay can be laid to his Charge. *A very little Ingenuity* may find *some Excuse* for any *Misconduct*; and here, I know, it is said, that the Expedition against *Carthagena* was so long delayed by Admiral *Vernon*'s being obliged to sail first to *Hispaniola*, in quest of the *French*. I shall grant, he could not go to attack *Carthagena*, and leave *Jamaica* exposed to be attack'd by the *French* from *Hispaniola*, and the *Spaniards* from *St. Jago de Cuba*, therefore I must suppose, he had Orders to speak a Word or two, *in his Way*, with the *French* Squadron, if he had found it in that Part of the World. But why was he not enabled to go sooner in Quest of the *French* Squadron? Why was our Fleet kept so long at the *Isle of Wight*? Here, I know, the whole Blame is laid upon the Winds. But this is the very Question in Dispute, and the Question that ought to be enquired into; because, I believe, a great Majority of the Nation impute it to another Cause, and most People think an equal Force, at least an equal Land Force, might have been sent to the *West Indies*, above a Twelvemonth before that Fleet failed.

There are several other Questions relating to this Disappointment, which it would be proper to enquire into, such as the *famous Retreat*, so loudly complained of both by Officer and Soldier, when our victorious Troops were in Pursuit of the Enemy, and in great Hopes of entering Pell-Mell with them into the *Fort Lazare*; the Shortness and bad Management of the Ladders; the want of Engineers, &c. But it would carry me too far, to set in a full View the many Complaints made upon this Occasion, by those that were upon the Spot. I have mentioned these, only to shew, that if any Enquiry be set on Foot, it ought not to stop at the Complaints of our Merchants: It ought to go to the whole Conduct of the War; because there are strong Suspicions, that all our Disappointments have been more owing to our own Misconduct, than to the Strength, Vigilance, or Conduct of the Enemy.

It is really something wonderful, that almost in every Thing we undertake, with Regard to the War, there should be *some known Circumstance* that, to vulgar Eyes, seems to point out a *Want of Conduct*. Even with respect to Commodore *Anson's* Expedition, from which our *Ministerial Accountant* expected such an Addition to the Nation's Account of Profit, every one knows, that he was at least *Three Months too late* in the Year of sailing
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from *England*; because the *best Season* for passing round *Cape Horn* is in *December*, which, with regard to Season, answers to the Month of *June* in our Northern Horizon, and the worst Season is about the End of *March*, and the whole Month of *April*, which answer to the Months of *September* and *October* here. Therefore the *best Time* for departing from *England*, in order to reach the Straits *Le Maire* and *Cape Horn* at the *proper Season*, is in the Months of *June*, that the Ships may have Time to put in and refresh their Men at *Madera* and *Brazil*: Whereas this Squadron did not depart from *England* 'till the 18th of *September* *, so that it did not reach the Straits *Le Maire* 'till the 7th of *March* †, soon after which, the *Equinoctial Winds* began to blow, which, considering the *Latitude* and the *high Land* at that End of the *American Continent*, must be expected to be vastly boisterous, and were known to our *Admiralty Board*, if they know any Thing, to be so: I mean our *Admiralty Board of Direction*; for now, it seems, we have *Two*, one for *Direction*, and another for *Action*. This, I say, was known in *Englan* 'long before this War began, and this unfortunate Squadron has found by fatal Experience to be true, to the *great Disappointment* of the *Publick*, and, perhaps, to the more

* See *London Daily Post*, *September 22*, 1740.

† See *London Daily Post*, *November 9*.

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sensible Disappointment of some private Adventurers.

I hope the Publick will now be able to judge, whether the *artful* Account of the Nation's *Profit and Loss* by the War, lately published and dispersed *Gratis*, serves to shew the *Malice* of *Domestick Enemies*, or the *Weakness, Impudence, Falshood, and Low Craft* of *Ministerial Hirelings*: I hope, what I have said will have its desired Effect; and therefore I shall add no more, save only, that since I began to write, I have seen a Letter from a Gentleman in *South Carolina*, who says, that since the Beginning of the War, or rather since our fruitless Attack upon *St. Augustine*, to the Beginning of *July* last, there had been *Thirty Two British Prizes* carried into that Place alone; which confirms what I have said, that many *British Ships* may have been taken in the *West Indies*, of which we have had no Information; and at the same Time, it shews, how careful we should have been, to make ourselves Masters of that *pitiful Fort* at the Beginning of the War, and how necessary it is to *enquire* into the Causes of that *Disappointment*.

F I N I S.



Since printing the above LIST, I hear, the Merchants have begun to take the proper Methods for procuring Redress; from whence, I hope soon to be enabled to correct the few Errors there may be in this, which I shall do in an APPENDIX, as soon as possible: And as I am convinced, the Number of Ships lost will not, upon the strictest Scrutiny, be diminished, but rather increased, the Amendments can no way alter, or derogate from the Strength of my Reasoning upon this Subject.

